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ABSTRACT 
 
Food value chain businesses form alliances with horizontal and/or vertical partners to take collective action to 
either overcome or ameliorate chain failure, or to take advantage of new opportunities available due to 
innovations in products or processes. The desired outcomes from the collective action would not be possible 
to achieve if these businesses acted independently. 
 
While such alliances may take many forms, depending on degree of commitment and infrastructure linkages, 
they can often be considered to be clubs. Four such types of clubs can be identified (1) horizontal clubs 
comprising businesses that take collective action across a single cross-section or an aggregate of multiple 
cross-sections in the value chain; (2) vertical clubs, which consist of businesses that form a strategic alliance for 
collective action along a single value chain within a network of chains; (3) clubs that specialise in a single 
product or multiple products in the value chain; or (4) clubs focusing on a single input/activity or multiple 
inputs/activities. Thus the path to collective action chosen by clubs may vary according to existing capabilities 
and the scope for collaboration, particularly in relation to the potential for value-creating innovation. The 
result of the collective action is the provision of a chain good or service which usually leads to greater and 
more valuable chain coordination. By collectively identifying, funding and acting to capture positive 
externalities associated with innovation, businesses in many parts of a food value chain can widen 
opportunities to increase whole-of-chain surplus as well as increase private profits. 
 
In this paper four mini-case studies are presented which demonstrate the breadth of past collective actions 
that have been undertaken by a substantial proportion of businesses in food value chains, two in Europe and 
two in Australia. These are (1) the Euro Pool System, (2) Global Standards certification in Europe and globally, 
(3) Meat Standards Australia, and (4) the OBE Beef organic producer alliance in Australia. Each case study 
yields insights into the rationale of how businesses in different food value chains in different countries have 
acted as a club to use their joint resources to internalise positive innovation and coordination externalities that 
would not have been possible to achieve were these businesses to act independently. 
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Introduction 
 
Our motivation in undertaking this review comes from trying to understand the separate and inter-related 
roles played by two concepts - value chain coordination mechanisms, and research, development and 
extension (RD&E) investments - in overcoming or ameliorating chain failure and so generating high 
performance food value chains. 
 
Coordination mechanisms in food value chains 
 
The standard supply chain texts do not place much analytical attention on chain coordination mechanisms per 
se. The components of the coordination mechanism, the so-called drivers, such as logistics and revenue 
management, do have analytical frameworks that are able to be optimised, but as yet there is little explicit 
guidance on how to design and implement a whole-of-chain coordination mechanism that leads to a high 
performing food value chain. 
 
For example, a commonly cited text, Chopra and Meindl (2013), has one only chapter out of 18 on 
coordination. Further, it is written in very non-analytical language and contains only generic suggestions about 
how to achieve better chain coordination – aligning goals and objectives; improving information visibility and 
accuracy; improving operational performance; designing pricing strategies to stabilise orders; and building 
strategic partnerships and trust. These suggestions seem self-evident. No case studies are provided (as are in 
almost every other chapter) and no measures are suggested which might be used to test for example whether 
an improvement in objective alignment would lead to better coordination. 
 
There needs to be a more explicit focus on chain coordination as a high level objective for well-performing 
food value chains, instead of as an ill-defined consequence of a collection of lower level actions, and there 
needs to be a more direct way of deciding when and how to invest in better chain coordination. 
 
Research, development and extension in food value chains 
 
RD&E in agricultural and food industries has long been recognised as having strong public good characteristics 
(e.g. Pannell and Roberts, 2015), justifying government intervention and funding. Much of this government 
involvement has taken place at the farm production level in food value chains where these public good 
characteristics are strongest. Private RD&E has also been prominent, but it has been confined principally to 
farm input industries such as seed, fertiliser and machinery. 
 
While both public and private RD&E in food industries have received a lot of attention in the literature, a less 
well covered issue concerns the broader term of innovation. We follow one of the most commonly cited 
definitions of innovation that adequately conveys its broad nature: “An innovation is the implementation of a 
new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new 
organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or external relations.” (OECD, 2005, para. 
146). 
 
Innovation is widespread in food value chains where it pays individual businesses to act independently to 
innovate in a variety of ways. But innovation also can be analysed to determine whether opportunities are 
being missed that would lead to higher whole-of-chain surplus by the collective action by businesses in the 
chain. While such collective action may take many forms, depending on degree of commitment and 
infrastructure linkages, they can often be considered to be clubs. 
 
Fleming, Griffith, Mounter and Baker (2018) identified four types of clubs for taking collective action in food 
value chains: (1) horizontal clubs comprising businesses that take collective action across a single cross-section 
or an aggregate of multiple cross-sections in the value chain; (2) vertical clubs, which consist of businesses that 
form a strategic alliance for collective action along a single value chain within a network of chains; (3) clubs 
that specialise in a single product or multiple products in the value chain; and (4) clubs focusing on a single 
input/activity or multiple inputs/activities. They concluded that the path to collective action chosen by clubs 
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may vary according to the scope for collaboration among businesses in the chain, particularly in relation to the 
potential for innovation. 
 
By collectively identifying, funding and acting to capture, positive externalities associated with innovation, 
businesses in many parts of a food value chain can collaborate to widen opportunities to increase chain 
surplus as well as increase private profits. 
 
Objectives of the review 
 
The overall objective of this review is to look back and examine how past issues of chain failure (Fleming et al., 
2018; Griffith et al., 2017; Malcom et al., 2017) have been dealt with by chain businesses acting collectively as 
clubs. The following four mini-case studies demonstrate the breadth of collective actions that have been 
recently undertaken by a substantial proportion of members of food value chains, two in Europe and two in 
Australia. These are the Euro Pool System, Global Standards certification in European countries, Meat 
Standards Australia, and the OBE Beef producer alliance in Australia. 
Each case study yields insights into the subject of how businesses in different industries in a food value chain 
have acted like a club to use their joint resources to internalise positive innovation externalities that would not 
have been possible to achieve were these businesses to act independently. 
 
Chain Failure and Chain Goods 
 
Following the discussion in Malcolm et al. (2017), the concept of chain failure is analogous to the concept of 
market failure that is used widely in the microeconomics literature. Bannock et al. (1984) defined market 
failure as a “situation in which economic efficiency has not been achieved through imperfections in the market 
mechanism” (p. 262), where economic efficiency is the “state of the economy in which no one can be made 
better off without someone being made worse off” (p. 125), commonly known as Pareto optimality.  
 
Chain failure is defined as the situation where a value chain fails to maximise chain surplus because it supplies 
a suboptimal level of throughput and value (Griffith et al., 2012). An economically efficient value chain is one 
in which no chain participant can be made better off without another participant being made potentially 
worse off. It can be determined by ascertaining where chain economic surplus is at a maximum. The degree to 
which chain economic surplus is less than its potential maximum value shows the extent of chain failure. In 
principle this can be determined by application of the standard microeconomic concepts of the production 
possibilities curve and expected iso-revenue curves (Mounter et al., 2016). 
 
Chain failure can occur for many reasons. These reasons do not include things like inefficient logistics (poor 
transport, processing or storage services), which are simply imperfections in existing markets. Typically, it 
occurs as a result of the absence in the value chain of processes and services that we call chain goods, which 
result in chain externalities. These are the cross-functional drivers such as information systems, and grading 
and certification systems, that allow customer willingness to pay to be more efficiently created, captured and 
transmitted up and down the chain. Less frequently it may be from the chain bads such as sumptuary goods 
(cigarettes, fatty foods) that impose social costs on customers. All these factors create positive and negative 
chain externalities, such that private values diverge from social values, and/or cause asymmetric information 
leading to adverse selection, moral hazard and the principal-agent problem. Chain failure can also arise from 
the many forms of market failure originating from outside the chain. 
 
Club goods and chain goods 
From a theoretical point of view the concept of a chain good can be considered as analogous to a club good 
(Buchanan, 1965; McNutt, 1999; Sandler and Hartley, 2001; Sandler, 2013), where the club comprises all or 
some members of a value chain. See Fleming et al. (2018) for a detailed discussion. 
 
A club good is a sub-type of a public good, and populates the space between a public good and a private good. 
McNutt (1999) sees club goods as public goods without non-excludability, while McVitie et al. (2009) note that 
club goods have private attributes but are rivalrous in use due to congestion. 
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Sandler and Tschirhart (1980, 1997) and Sandler (2013) document the five decade history and rationale of club 
theory, demonstrating how its application informs a wide range of collective actions that benefit club 
members. None of the examples provided in the most recent review of club theory included value chains or 
anything close to them. Useful insights can be gained about the operations of value chains by considering 
them as “latent clubs”, that is, systems having the potential for improvement through collective action. Club 
theory can be used to examine how to increase the surplus of a food value chain using collective action within 
a club good framework. Such goods are “chain goods”. 
 
Chain goods are those goods and services that enable coordination across partners in a value chain. They 
resemble the facilitating functions of agricultural markets (Kohls and Uhl, 1980, Chapter 2, 25): “The facilitating 
functions are those that make possible the smooth performance of the exchange and physical functions. These 
activities are not directly involved in exchanging title or physically handling products, but without them 
modern marketing systems would not work. The facilitating services might aptly be called ‘the grease that 
makes the wheels of the marketing machine go around’”. The four key groupings of facilitating functions are 
usually categorised as standardisation, financing, risk-bearing, and market intelligence. If these types of 
services and processes are missing from the value chain, the chain partners cannot make decisions to increase 
profit of the whole chain. If chain partners see a chance to provide collectively such goods and services, then 
forming a club that comprises the whole chain or a subset of the chain may be an efficient way to do it. 
 
We now move to the four mini-case studies where we look back at some past investments in value chain 
coordination mechanisms that have been collectively provided by chain businesses acting as a club. 
 
Euro Pool System 
 
Much of the fresh fruit and vegetables that is grown in the warmer climates of southern Europe is consumed in 
the high population centres in northern Europe. Logistics has always been important in these value chains. 
However as the large German and Dutch retailers expanded their operations across borders and offered more 
variety to their customers, pressure to increase the efficiency of the chain was passed back to the suppliers to 
these retailers. In 1992 three cooperative auction houses in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium formed an 
alliance to improve the logistics of packaging fresh produce for transfer in European value chains of fruits and 
vegetables. This alliance was named Euro Pool System (EPS). Its business was to provide to its members 
standardised, reusable, stackable plastic trays that could be filled “on farm” and used to display produce on 
supermarket shelves, as well as the associated operational knowledge. 
 
EPS therefore began life as a horizontal club comprising three entities (on behalf of many hundreds of 
individual members) taking collective action across multiple cross-sections in the fresh produce value chain. It 
was incorporated in 1996, with the auction houses continuing their involvement as shareholders. During the 
next two decades, EPS has expanded its operations to 50 depots in 27 countries and the range of products 
using their folding reusable trays has been increased to include fish, meat, baked and convenience products. 
Annual rotation of trays has expanded rapidly and reached almost 1 billion by 2016 (EPS, 2017). 
 
EPS (2017) emphasises the need for ‘close collaboration among retailers, EPS and other supply chain partners’ 
and its ‘intensive relationship with clients’ to improve what is a complex and challenging set of conditions in 
fresh produce value chains. To this end, its system entails a club-like form of collaboration that involves all 
members of fresh food value chains but which is centred on one activity in these chains – use of the trays. The 
process begins with fresh food producers and ends with fresh food retailers returning the trays. The provision 
of trays by EPS is initiated by an order for trays typically by a producer of fruits and vegetables or, increasingly, 
other fresh produce, who puts down a deposit and pays EPS a rent for each crate – step 1 in an 8-step system 
described in EPS (2017). The cycle of tray usage is completed in steps 7 and 8 when retailers return empty 
trays to the EPS service centre, for which they are credited, and the trays are checked and prepared for their 
next use. EPS offers the option to integrate its service activities into the independent distribution centres of 
value chain members that use large volumes of trays. This option eliminates the transport of empty crates 
back to an EPS service centre. 
 
The tray rental is a quasi-membership fee for shared services – termed an entry fee by Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
(2012) – that is paid by value chain members for participating in the system. It is, in effect, the first part of a 
two-part tariff system, and is a variable amount because it is charged to all ‘club’ members according to their 
Hartmann et al. / Proceedings in System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks 2018, 321-328 
325 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18461/pfsd.2018.1825 
use of trays. EPS also offers a suite of services to chain members on a fee-for-service basis, the second part of 
the two-part tariff. Innovation is at the heart of this second part, which covers services ‘such as the handling 
and consolidation of waste packaging, pallets, displays and unsold product’ (EPS, 2017) and entails the use of 
state-of-the-art information technologies such as 2D barcode labels on trays. It enables members of the ‘club’ 
to convert latent demand for services into effective demand by sharing services that otherwise would not have 
been satisfied, which enhances knowledge throughout the chain thereby expanding the potential for chain 
improvement and higher surplus. 
 
The benefits of the system as outlined by EPS (2017) are: guaranteed availability of trays and efficient order 
picking; high levels of cleanliness and hygiene; efficient logistics; CO2 reduction; and online pool management 
that enhances members’ control over packaging flows and financial transactions. EPS (2017) assert that the 
blue and green trays they provide have the advantages over packaging rivals of negligible product loss or 
damage, easy handling, quick use, greater product capacity, low folded profile, optimal tracking and tracing, 
perfect stacking with other types of packaging, perfect product presentation in shops, ability to withstand 
heavy loads, and an estimated 10-year life of trays that are fully recyclable. 
 
Thus, a chain failure was overcome by the provision of a chain good through the collective action of relevant 
value chain partners and the ongoing use of innovations in materials handling and tracking. 
 
Global Standards Certification in European Countries 
 
As the range of goods available to consumers expanded rapidly in the post war period and the recording of 
transactions moved towards electronic processes, the lack of explicit and unique identification of individual 
products became more problematic. Value chains were failing. After much debate, in 1973 industry leaders in 
the United States selected a single standard for product identification. This was the barcode. An industry 
organisation, GS1, was created to administer the standard. A similar debate was occurring in Europe and in 
1977 the European Article Numbering Association was formed. In subsequent years EAN became GS1 Europe 
and then in 1990 the two GS1 organisations merged to form a single standard for product identification in 
almost 50 countries. Today, GS1 has a presence in over 150 countries (GS1, 2018b). 
GS1 is a “neutral, not-for-profit, global organisation that develops and maintains the most widely used supply 
chain standards system in the world” (GS1, 2018a, 2). It was set up as a club between retailers and supply 
chain partners. Today in Europe, GS1 is a collaboration of 46 local GS1 organisations, including Russia and 
many of the countries in the former USSR, Israel and South Africa. Across the globe, GS1 claim they have close 
to two million user companies with local member organisations in over 110 countries. 
The benefits of GS1 are stated to be to “increase the efficiency of your supply chain; ensure fast end-to-end 
traceability in a cost effective way; reduce spoilage of food; meet the needs of the new consumer; and provide 
one solution serving various purposes.” (GS1, 2018c, 3). 
Again, a two-part tariff arrangement is used. A membership fee based on turnover provides access to the GS1 
standards, while individual businesses which need specific solutions pay user charges for that. And again, a 
chain failure was overcome by the provision of a chain good through the collective action of relevant value 
chain partners and the ongoing use of innovations in electronics. 
 
Meat Standards Australia
2
 
 
Meat Standards Australia (MSA) is a voluntary grading system designed to predict beef eating quality that was 
introduced in the domestic market in Australia in 1999/2000 (Griffith et al., 2010). The MSA grades are based 
on the taste panel responses of untrained consumers (Griffith and Thompson, 2012) while the system itself 
uses a “total quality management approach”, from animal genetics through to cooking method (Polkinghorne 
et al., 1998; Thompson, 2002). 
 
                                                          
2
 The material presented here has been summarised from Mounter et al. (2016). 
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The rationale for investing in the original RD&E that underpinned the MSA model was that beef consumers in 
Australia in the early 1990s were turning away from beef because they could not be guaranteed the same 
eating quality experience they were willing to pay for, each time they purchased beef. Eating quality was 
subjective and based on vague notions of breed, age and feeding regime, and there was no relationship 
between consumer preferences, willingness to pay, and the offered quality differentials. Ways of classifying 
carcases and therefore ways of describing quality varied across suppliers. Brands were little used at the retail 
level. There was no objective, uniform system to provide the guarantee that consumers wanted and were 
willing to pay for. 
 
We now recognise that this was a clear case of chain failure. Recall that chain failure occurs when a value chain 
fails to maximise chain surplus because it supplies a suboptimal level of throughput and value (Griffith et al., 
2012). An economically efficient value chain, where chain economic surplus is at a maximum, is one in which 
no one chain participant can be made better off without another chain participant being made potentially 
worse off. The degree to which chain economic surplus is not at its maximum shows the extent of chain failure. 
Prior to 2000, the Australian fresh beef value chain was not able to deliver the product that consumers’ 
wanted, so chain surplus was less than it could have been.  
 
The solution to the chain failure, the development of MSA, is a chain good. As pointed out by Griffith et al. 
(2010), Doljanin (2016) and Griffith and Thompson (2012), the value of the MSA scheme is derived at the retail 
level where consumers are willing to pay premiums for beef cuts that are guaranteed tender (MSA-graded 
beef) in contrast to ungraded beef marketed through the conventional grid system where minimal 
inducements are offered for eating quality improvements. The feedback on carcass quality received by 
registered producers combined with adherence to MSA standards facilitates product consistency in both 
production and consumption. Thus the MSA scheme is able to create a new source of value by delivering 
guaranteed quality, and to capture and transmit that value back through the chain. The evidence shows that 
all participants in the value chain for MSA beef share in the additional value created by the introduction of the 
MSA scheme (Griffith and Thompson, 2012). 
 
The chain failure resulted from both the absence of a well-functioning beef grading scheme, and asymmetric 
information leading to perverse economic behaviour known as adverse selection, moral hazard and the 
principal-agent problem (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2012). As well, the investment required to undertake the 
collection of data in the field and in the processing plant of many thousands of animals and the more than 
100,000 consumer taste tests was simply too large to be contemplated by any one business in the beef value 
chain or even by the whole network. That is, the transactions costs were too high. A strong argument could 
therefore be made for a public contribution to funding, as outlined by Swann (2003). 
 
OBE Beef
3
 
 
In the early 1990s another chain failure was recognised in the Australian beef market in that the then current 
beef marketing arrangements, as with the lack of grading on the domestic market, were not delivering rewards 
for quality product on export markets. In particular, a high quality organic beef market was emerging in Japan 
but capturing the extra value was problematic. So in 1995 a club was formed by 30 beef producers in outback 
Queensland and the Northern Territory who owned over 7 million hectares of organic pastoral country, 
specifically to market organic beef to Japan (OBE Beef, 2018). They formed strategic alliances with processors, 
transport companies and a Japanese wholesaler to achieve some control of the value chain so as to capture 
more of the market value. It is claimed that they receive a 30 per cent premium for their product in Japan.  
 
The various alliances within the club therefore provide a range of chain goods that any producer acting 
individually would be unable to do: specialised accreditation, aggregation, branding, marketing, education and 
communication functions.  
 
Part of the market premium received by the club members is levied as a fee to provide the specialised services. 
Thus, the individual members act together to jointly provide horizontal and vertical chain goods for the benefit 
of the whole club. 
 
                                                          
3
 The material presented here has been summarised from Malcolm et al. (2017). 
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Concluding Comments 
 
In the four very different case studies presented above it has been shown that value chain businesses have 
formed clubs to act collectively to achieve specific chain coordination objectives in the industries in which they 
are engaged. These objectives could not have been achieved by these businesses acting individually. The clubs 
have been both horizontal and vertical and both input and product focussed. In practice, the concepts of clubs, 
club goods and chain goods seem to provide a useful framework to analyse how value chain businesses work 
together to implement innovations and deal with chain failure. 
 
However, the case studies have also shown that these clubs have changed quite markedly over time. Business 
models and governance models have evolved, and while all of the case study clubs have expanded their 
operations across regions and across products, the nature of the expansion has been at different rates. 
 
Some of the differences may be due to the links mentioned earlier between innovation and coordination – 
certainly GS1 and EuroPool have been able to take advantage of the spectacular advances in electronics to 
refine the value chain coordination mechanisms they use and to add value to their members. OBE Beef, 
however, is a more traditional producer alliance and is less reliant on rapid technological changes. 
Some of the differences may also be due to the degree to which the objectives of all club members are 
aligned. Again, GS1 and EuroPool have a narrow and specific focus on particular value chain inputs – product 
identification processes, and fresh produce packaging, respectively. Every member of those two clubs is vitally 
interested in those processes. The MSA alliance is a much more diverse club. Members undertake their 
business in different regions, at different levels of their value chains and at different scales of operation and 
levels of specialisation.  Some of their business objectives may be closely aligned with the MSA concept, but 
others may not. 
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